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A Closer Look at the Limits of Consociationalism

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Abstract

Although scholars agree that ethnically divided societies are generally more prone to political violence, critics of consociationalism suggest that proportional representation and parliamentarism provide poor solutions for ethnically heterogeneous settings. I argue that extant findings about the impacts of powersharing institutions on conflict likelihood assume that institutions have a linear relationship with ethnic diversity, whereas in reality, the relationship is more complex. I demonstrate that proportional representation and parliamentarism are associated with an increased likelihood of civil conflict at mid-range levels of diversity but are associated with a decreased risk of conflict in more extremely divided settings, while federalism is independently associated with greater conflict risk at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The results underscore that the peace-promoting effects of institutions may depend on how *polarized* societies are, encouraging scholars to think more seriously about the effectiveness of consociationalism for mitigating violence where there is greater ethnic diversity.

Keywords

consociationalism, civil conflict, ethnicity, political institutions

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Introduction

Do inclusive and decentralized political institutions increase the likelihood of domestic conflict in more ethnically divided societies? Consociationalism, a particular variant of consensus democracy, has long been defended as way to promote stability and reduce political violence between societal segments in deeply divided states (Lijphart, 1969, 1977, 1981, 1984, 1999). Lijphart and others argued that institutional features such as proportional representation (PR), federalism, and parliamentary government can alleviate tensions by providing minority guarantees and supporting local governance where there are more politically salient identities (Andeweg, 2000; Brancati & Snyder, 2011, 2013). The consociational model has also long been criticized, with more recent empirical work suggesting that its elements exacerbate the risk of conflict (Graham, Miller, & Strøm, 2017; Horowitz, 2014; Selway & Templeman, 2012). Although institutions such as PR and federalism have been the prevailing recommendation for postconflict agreements aiming to promote inclusivity and preserve peace, they have met with limited success (Bogaards, 2013). The question of whether such institutions actually reduce the risk of conflict thus remains an important question.

In this article, I assert that outstanding conclusions about the impacts of particular institutions in ethnically diverse states can be attributed to models that fail to account for nonlinear effects. By ignoring the way in which ethnic *polarization* can affect the success of powersharing institutions, prevailing research is conflating the conflict-moderating effect of institutions in more diverse settings with their failures in settings that involve a smaller number of ethnic groups. Consociational institutions appear positively associated with conflict in more diverse states because of their inability to resolve disagreements at mid-range levels of diversity, but they are associated with less conflict risk in more ethnically divided settings. Although the relationship between polarization and domestic conflict has been demonstrated, it has not fully transferred to research regarding institutional solutions for mitigating ethnic conflict. This article aims to qualify extant conclusions about the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and consociational institutions by demonstrating the nonlinear interaction between them.[1]

Based on a large-*N* sample of countries that covers the period 1900-2000, I evaluate the ways in which specific institutions interact with measures of ethnic diversity to provide a more nuanced view of the potential impacts of consociationalism on the incidence of domestic conflict in more ethnically divided societies.[2] I show a persistent curvilinear relationship between consociational institutions and ethnic heterogeneity as it pertains to conflict risk. The results suggest that PR and parliamentarism may make conflict more

likely at moderate levels of ethnic diversity—where ethnic polarization should be greater—, but that they reduce conflict risk in the most diverse settings. In contrast, federalism appears to exacerbate conflict risk among settings with the greatest amount of ethnic diversity, although its effects may differ in combination with other institutions. These findings are consistent with prior research that portrayed consociational elements as having a positive, linear interaction with ethnic fractionalization, but also with arguments for when they should have the greatest peace-promoting effects.

Along with the challenges of representing ethnicity and dealing with endogeneity, I show that the functional link between identity and institutions is more complex than previously assumed. This takeaway point presents a third goal for research on the effects of powersharing institutions. It emphasizes the distinction between ethnic fractionalization and polarization and encourages the application of this distinction in analyses that aim to understand how political institutions and ethnic identities interact. To this end, the results support a revision of contemporary conclusions that assumed a linear interaction between the two. At a minimum, the results refute the conclusion that parliamentarism and proportionalism make conflict more likely in the most diverse settings. This is important for interpreting the argument of consociationalism's biggest advocate, who emphasized the importance of creating a "multiple balance of power among subcultures" (Lijphart, 1969, p. 217).

The debate over whether consociational institutions reduce domestic conflict has valuable repercussions for policy-making in countries dealing with issues related to powersharing and postconflict stability. The conclusions from current research on comparative institutions have the potential to promote peace by dispelling myths about the feasibility of consociationalism or to make it worse by discouraging the use of successful institutional solutions. More broadly, the relationship between political institutions and ethnic identity has important implications for other areas of comparative politics. This study therefore expounds on the way in which PR, parliamentarism, and federalism interact with ethnic heterogeneity. In the following sections, I define the concept of consociationalism and overview existing treatments of it. I then outline a research design that aims for a parsimonious empirical model, but which distinguishes moderate from high levels of ethnic diversity. The results indicate that specific institutions—proportionalism and parliamentarism, but not federalism—may moderate conflict risk in the most diverse settings.

Theory

Whether couched in debates about the success of *majoritarian* versus *consensus* democracy, or the difference between *centripetal* and *centrifugal*

institutions, at heart is the issue of whether certain political institutions promote more stable government in settings characterized by diverse interests and identities. An alternative to majoritarian systems, the "consociational democracy model," proposes institutions that promote accommodation and recognition by enhancing autonomy and encouraging collaborative governance. Lijphart was one of the most prolific writers on the benefits of consociational government (Lijphart, 1968, 1977, 1984).[3] Based on a comparison of mostly European democracies, Lijphart characterized them according to the degree of fragmentation and competitiveness on one hand, and the homogeneity of interests on the other. Lijphart argued that fragmented but stable democracies were undergirded by consociationalism, which is defined by the promotion of grand coalition building, the proportional allocation of government seats, group autonomy across levels of government, and minority veto power (Grofman & Stockwell, 2001).[4] The logic behind consociationalism is that elites can help to overcome the "centrifugal" tendencies of a fragmented society by applying institutions that make cooperation more likely and by providing minority protections (Mühlbacher, 2009).

Consociationalism is supported by features such as PR, parliamentary democracy, and federalism. PR can foster peace by lowering the threshold for smaller parties to gain seats in the legislature, enabling them to participate in government. It reduces the likelihood that parties and interests are excluded and encourages the formation of coalition governments, which in turn should increase legitimacy and prevent spoilers (Blaydes & De Maio, 2010; Bogaards, 2013). In contrast, majoritarian electoral systems tend to reward the party that gains the most votes and can lead to more extreme rhetoric and demands. Efforts to win at the expense of other parties encouraged by "winner-take-all" rules exert centrifugal forces that reduce the chances for ethnic cooperation, as "ethnic entrepreneurs" have an incentive to use identity as a basis for mobilizing voters (Reilly, 2000, 2002). Presidential governments may also be more dangerous compared with parliamentary regimes, inasmuch as the executive does not need a legislative majority to remain in office and fixed terms shape their behavior (Linz, 1990). Federalism, which refers to a system of government in which subnational units exercise some degree of autonomy and decision-making power, gives regional groups greater capacity to provide policy inputs and to advocate on their behalf (Hartmann, 2013). By placing government in local hands and allowing citizens to take greater part in the administration of their affairs, federalism can strengthen territorial recognition, enable groups to protect their interests, and provide checks on the central government (Bermeo, 2002; Hartmann, 2013).

The consociational model has received a number of criticisms. First, the institutions that make up the consociational arrangement could actually

worsen the prospects for peace in ethnically divided societies. By reinforcing ethnic identities and reflecting them in their design, such institutions may make ethnic conflict more likely to recur. Ethnofederalism can strengthen ethnic identities, for example, and does not require collaboration at the subnational level (Christin & Hug, 2012); it can also enhance the ability of local groups to mobilize against the government and inflame demands for secession (Erk & Anderson, 2009; Hartmann, 2013). Because consociationalism is often negotiated where political identity is most salient, it tends to revolve around fixed-identity guarantees that can become entrenched over time (McCulloch, 2014). "If centripetal arrangements are sometimes subject to degradation, consociational arrangements can be very difficult to modify" (Horowitz, 2014, p. 11). At the same time, "preferential" electoral systems, such as the alternative vote or single nontransferable vote, provide an alternative to PR that can moderate ethnic tension, such that PR is not a necessary solution (Fraenkel & Grofman, 2004; Horowitz, 1993; Reilly, 2012). Scholars have also debated whether parliamentary democracy is less stable than presidentialism (Cheibub, 2006; Linz, 1990; Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni, & Stanton, 2002). Others have argued that mechanisms of control and interethnic bargaining better explain the prevalence of peace in the presence of deep divisions than the institutions that exist alongside it (Lustick, 1979; Rothchild, 1970).

Second, Lijphart has been criticized for using an inductive approach based on preexisting democracies and European cases to devise solutions to ethnic conflicts (Bormann et al., 2014). Others have argued that, where it was intended to encourage accommodating political institutions, the specific arrangement of institutions connoted by consociationalism is unnecessarily narrow (Andeweg, 2000). Horowitz (1990), for example, argued that the concern with presidential democracies was largely "an argument not against the presidency but against plurality election, [and] not in favor of parliamentary systems but in favor of parliamentary coalitions" (p. 79). Mühlbacher (2009) highlighted the fact that, in subsequent work on the topic, Lijphart became increasingly broad, moving from consociational institutions to a discussion of consensual institutions and then to powersharing more generally. As such, in addition to circumspection over its applicability (Simonsen, 2005), scholars have encouraged "revised" consociationalism that promotes the spirit of inclusion over specific institutions (McGarry & O'Leary, 2006).

The question espoused by the debate over consociationalism is whether political institutions should incorporate and accommodate separately or avoid replicating existing divisions, and whether specific institutions matter (Reilly, 2002). Despite its pervasiveness, it is an important question: nearly every country in the world utilizes some combination of proportional choice rules,

parliamentarism, and federalism, and recommending them has been the prevailing international practice (Reilly, 2013). Bogaards (2013) examined peace agreements that followed the conclusion of civil wars between 1975 and 2011, noting that specifying the type of electoral system almost always involved some degree of PR. Among the cases that Bogaards (2013) examined, consociational elements were present at least part of the time between the year of the peace agreement and 2016, during which conflict recurrence was unlikely (accounting for only 14% of the total years). Although it does not take into account what the risk of conflict recurrence would have been had the parties agreed to alternative arrangements, this finding is noteworthy considering that all were subject to civil war prior to reaching an agreement.

In four countries, internal conflict continued or resumed following the peace agreement. On the face of it, however, the resumption of violence in those cases seems to be due to continuing perceptions of exclusion, which could have been assuaged with additional inclusive institutions. In Burundi, achieving peace was complicated by the refusal of smaller Hutu rebel groups to sign onto the deal. Although the last major rebel group transformed into a political party in 2009, attempts by former rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza to remain president prompted attacks attributed to rival groups. In Angola, the resumption of fighting occurred after the leader of a rival rebel party lost presidential elections to José Eduardo dos Santos. Likewise, former members of the rebels-turned-party RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance), which continued to receive local support and maintained tight social networks, returned to armed opposition as recently as 2013 after its leader consistently came in second place in elections (Bowker, Kamm, & Sambo, 2016; Manning, 1998; Wiegink, 2015).

Three of the four cases that remained beset by conflict utilized PR apart from other consociational institutions, which could suggest that PR *by itself* does not significantly reduce the likelihood of ethnic violence. Liberia, however, provides a contrasting example of the potential for PR to independently mollify the risks of ethnic violence. Conflict began in 1989 when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) launched an insurrection against the military regime headed by General Samuel Doe (Nilsson, 2009). Doe was killed in the fighting that ensued and NPFL leader Charles Taylor was confirmed president in the 1997 elections, but rebel fighting continued. The conflict had a distinctly ethnic component; Doe disproportionately provided his fellow co-ethnics, the Krahn, political and economic appointments, whereas many of the rebels who fought alongside Taylor belonged to other ethnic groups (Gio and Mano). As president, Taylor undermined the Krahn-dominated armed forces and went to war with rebel groups dominated by members of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. A key element in the peace

negotiations that began in 2003—and which resulted in lasting peace—was a transitional government that included ministerial positions and reserved seats for the rebels (Nilsson, 2009).

Scholars have taken a variety of approaches to assess the impact of formal powersharing institutions on conflict, but have not reached a consensus on the topic (Bormann, 2010; Reilly, 2012). Several empirical studies have shown that presidential democracies and majoritarian institutions increase the risk of conflict outcomes, whereas consociational practices and institutions—particularly federalism and PR—decrease it (Bermeo, 2002; Cohen, 1997; Fjelde & Hoglund, 2014; Krain, 1998; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Saideman et al., 2002; Schneider & Wiesehomeier, 2008). Proportional systems may make it easier for extremist parties to gain a foothold, but it also increases the likelihood of coalition governments and encourages fewer within-system terrorist groups (Aksoy & Carter, 2014; Blais & Bodet, 2006; Carter, 2002). Still, their effects may vary by level of conflict intensity and conflict type. Federalism, for example, is associated with an increased likelihood of low-level conflict, such as protests and riots, but a decreased likelihood of high-level conflict (Cohen, 1997; Ishiyama, 2009; Selway & Templeman, 2012). Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino (2007) also show that parliamentary representation makes ethnic conflict less likely, but not successionist conflict.

Others have provided evidence indicating that inclusive and dispersive powersharing institutions make conflict *more* likely (Gates, Graham, Lupu, Strand, & Strøm, 2016; Strøm, Gates, Graham, & Strand, 2015), although the specific institutions that they connote is unclear and they also do not consider how such arrangements interact with ethnic diversity. Graham et al. (2017) found that inclusive powersharing promotes democratic survival in postconflict settings, whereas dispersive institutions such as federalism can be detrimental to the survival of democracies after conflict.[5] In contrast, Selway and Templeman (2012) showed that PR and parliamentarism increase conflict risk in more ethnically heterogeneous settings but that the effect of federalism is uncertain. Focusing on the share of units controlled by national minorities, Christin and Hug (2012) argued that federalism makes ethnonationalism more volatile.

Judgments about the success of consociational institutions, therefore, are decidedly mixed. In part, the different conclusions can be explained by shortcomings in the mechanisms that purportedly explain the peace-promoting effects of consensus institutions in divided societies. Norris (2002) found no evidence for the proposition that proportional party-list systems are directly associated with higher levels of support for the political system among ethnic minorities; first-past-the-post systems can promote ethnic inclusion better than list systems (Bogaards, 2013), and proportional and parliamentary

systems do not necessarily lead to greater representation of ethnic groups (Alonso & Ruiz-Rufino, 2007; Gallagher, 1992; Ruedin, 2009). Huber (2012) found that PR is negatively associated with ethnicization. Sartori (1986) argued that PR does not make more parties likely, but is a side effect of removing obstacles; what matters is the strength of regional parties (Brancati, 2006).

Furthermore, many studies have tended to make overly simplistic assumptions about the relationship of institutions with ethnic diversity. For example, although scholars acknowledge that greater ethnic diversity is related to conflict—by including measures of ethnic fractionalization as controls—they do not interact ethnicity and institutions. Many of the above-mentioned examples do not condition the effects of institutions on ethnic diversity and thus do not provide direct insights into the important conditional relationship between demography and institutions (Wucherpfennig, Metternich, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2012). This underscores one of the major criticisms of scholars' use of measures of ethnic fractionalization, which is that they often include it as a control variable without seriously considering the way in which ethnic diversity links to conflict (Saideman, 2017). Selway and Templeman (2012) represents one of the only studies that investigated the interaction of specific institutions and ethnic heterogeneity, thus making it an important contribution to the debate.

Moreover, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) argued that more ethnically diverse states do not necessarily suffer from more conflict, but that certain *configurations* are at a greater risk. Scholars have pointed to ethnic *polarization* as a distinct mechanism by which ethnic diversity contributes to conflict (Esteban & Ray, 2008; Lacina, 2006; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005, 2010; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Schneider & Wiesehomeier, 2008). Polarized societies are defined by the separation of individuals into few groups, and they are most polarized where the distribution is perfectly bimodal—"when there are only two types of individuals" (Esteban & Ray, 2008, p. 167). In more ethnically polarized societies, there is not only a dominant majority but also a large ethnic minority as well. In such settings, the costs of coordination are lower for individuals within each group, increasing the likelihood of distributional conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; Esteban & Ray, 1999; Horowitz, 1985).

The diversity of ethnic identities and the capacity for society to become polarized are closely intertwined, but are not monotonically related. At the low end of ethnic fractionalization, which indicates more homogeneous societies, ethnic minorities are likely to be few in number and pose less of a threat to the dominant majority. At high levels of fractionalization, the diversity of ethnic groups also prevents one minority group from being large enough to



Figure 1. Relationship between ethnic fractionalization and polarization.

challenge the majority. Rather, polarization should be most likely when diversity is high enough to produce minority groups but low enough for them to be sizable. As illustrated by Figure 1, the development of large ethnic groups that are relatively balanced, and thus poised to exploit identity to win a political majority, occurs at mid-range levels of ethnic fractionalization (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005, 2010).[6]

The potential impact of ethnic diversity on the number of groups that might compete for resources, and the relative balance of power between them, has led scholars to argue that polarization is a more appropriate measure of the link between ethnicity and conflict than heterogeneity (Esteban & Ray, 2008; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). To this end, some have used alternative measures to capture polarization or to represent the relative balance between ethnic groups, showing them to be positively related to the likelihood of domestic conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Ellingsen, 2000; Reynal-Querol, 2002). Others have simply accounted for the nonmonotonic impacts of ethnic heterogeneity in empirical models of conflict by including squared terms, showing that greater fractionalization is actually associated with *less* conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2004; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002; Sambanis, 2001). As Schneider and Wiesehomeier (2008) demonstrated, this has

important implications regarding the ways in which political institutions interact with ethnic diversity and affect conflict risk.

Despite acknowledging the role of ethnic polarization, extant studies on the topic of consociationalism have not regarded its relationship to ethnic fractionalization (Selway & Templeman, 2012). Selway (2010), for example, argued that ethnic "cross-cuttingness" decreases conflict likelihood when ethnic fractionalization is low but increases it as fractionalization increases; although the author included fractionalization and polarization in separate specifications, they did not account for the nonmonotonicity of ethnic diversity that links the two. The relationship between ethnic diversity and group dynamics is nevertheless crucial to Lijphart's characterization of the mechanism by which consociationalism moderates the risk of ethnic conflict. Lijphart (1969) emphasized that one of the factors most conducive to consociationalism was multiple balance of power among subcultures, rather than a dual balance of power or clear hegemony: "[I]n a society with two evenly matched subcultures, the leaders of both may hope to achieve their aims by domination rather than cooperation" (p. 217). Likewise, "[w]hen political parties in a fragmented society are the organized manifestations of political subcultures, a multiparty system is more conducive to consociational democracy and therefore to stability than a two-party system" (Lijphart, 1969, p. 218). Although accommodative institutions may appear to worsen the prospects for peace in more diverse settings, this could result from group dynamics at moderate levels of ethnic fractionalization. Group polarization at mid-range levels of ethnic diversity may link ethnic heterogeneity to conflict.

Although scholars have argued that a bipolar setting can induce in-group policing and enhance interethnic cooperation (Fearon & Laitin, 2003), the occurrence of polarization at moderate levels of diversity may make conflict more likely by increasing the salience of ethnicity as a strategy for securing votes and gaining power (Bhavnani & Miodownik, 2008; Chandra, 2004). A smaller number of equally balanced groups enhances cohesiveness and decreases the incentives to form coalitions, engendering a zero-sum competition between them and leading to political deadlock over policy decisions (Dodd, 1976; Laver & Shepsle, 1996; LeBas, 2006; Posner, 2004; Stepan & Skach, 1993). Party polarization is an effective tool for mobilizing support and preventing group fragmentation, but it can also prevent moderation and enhance exclusionary strategies (LeBas, 2006). Thus, at "mid-range" levels of ethnic fractionalization, groups operating in a setting that depends on coalition building and cooperation may actually render such institutions ineffective for resolving political conflicts. By contrast, at more extreme levels of fractionalization, ethnic groups are smaller in size and greater in number,

which should increase the attractiveness of using alternative strategies to mobilize support, including coalition building. Constituent groups with divergent preferences, as represented by more ethnic identities, should be more likely to view the government as legitimate and support peaceful dispute resolution as a result of having their interests represented in government, by participating in coalitions and by having some degree of local autonomy. Political institutions that facilitate this, such as PR, parliamentary democracy, and federalism, give groups a greater capacity to engage in bargaining and to advocate on their behalf and should reduce the likelihood that their differences result in conflict.

This suggests an important qualification to the limits of consociationalism for moderating conflict risk in settings characterized by a multiplicity of salient ethnic identities. At mid-range levels of ethnic heterogeneity, such institutions should be less effective at inducing the cooperation of a small number of ethnic groups, particularly where they are equally balanced. Only at higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity—where there are more salient ethnic groups—should inclusive political institutions help to reduce conflict risk stemming from the promotion of ethnicity and opportunities for exclusion (Blaydes & De Maio, 2010; Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010).[7] Insofar as consociational institutions promote cooperation and coalition building, they should be more effective where there is a greater number of ethnic groups to form coalitions. The effects of consociational institutions on conflict risk in the presence of ethnic group competition should therefore be nonlinear, increasing at moderate levels of diversity and decreasing in more diverse settings. This expectation is reflected in the following two-part hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a: Consociational institutions are positively associated with conflict at higher levels of ethnic diversity.
Hypothesis 1b: Consociational institutions are negatively associated with conflict at the highest levels of ethnic diversity.

The features of consociationalism outlined by Lijphart involved coalition building, proportionality, minority veto, and cultural autonomy, but they were not defined by specific institutional configurations. Testing the effects of PR, parliamentarism, and federalism follows other scholars in advancing a more institutionalized notion of consociationalism that is consistent with, but does not perfectly align with, the ideas developed by Lijphart and others. To the extent that the effects of features such as PR, parliamentary democracy, and federalism are nonmonotonic—exacerbating conflict risk in moderately diverse societies but mitigating in more diverse settings—, it would be incorrect to conclude that they are only positively associated with conflict at higher

levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The interactive effect may not be the same for each of the three types of institutions, but insofar as they represent consociational features, my a priori assumption is that their effects are the same.

The nonmonotonic relationship to ethnic diversity may also not be specific to the three institutions examined here. Although the argument might extend to other factors that are expected to moderate the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on civil conflict, this article endeavors to add qualifications to existing conclusions about the effects of PR, parliamentary democracy, and federalism specifically. By focusing on one aspect of the dynamic between ethnic diversity, institutions, and conflict, I test whether features commonly used to denote consensus democracy really exacerbate conflict likelihood in more ethnically diverse settings. Understanding the nonlinear relationship between inclusive institutions and ethnic diversity as it pertains to conflict is not only a central modeling innovation but also a qualification that has important policy ramifications.

Research Design

The specific issue that I address concerns the potential nonlinearity of institutional effects across levels of ethnic diversity. The data that I use to analyze this come from the version 8 data set by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Coppedge et al., 2018), an ongoing collaborative effort that surveys thousands of country experts to derive estimates of specific indicators of democracy. To indicate the incidence of domestic violence—the dependent variable—I use a binary indicator of internal armed conflict created by Brecke (2001), which denotes conflict-years in which 32 or more deaths occurred. These data cover a larger time span (1789-2000) than other measures of internal armed conflict such as that from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Eck & Pettersson, 2018; N. Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002), but use a slightly higher threshold for counting conflict years. The two data sets are not strongly correlated—roughly 53% of conflict years coded by Brecke (2001) are also coded as such by N. Gleditsch et al. (2002), whereas about 61% of conflict observations coded by N. Gleditsch et al. (2002) are included by Brecke (2001). I therefore compare the analyses presented below with similar models based on the UCDP/PRIO data.

I deal with the endogenous relationship between conflict and institutional choice by estimating the incidence of conflict as a function of whether there was conflict in the prior year, treating the outcome as a first-order autoregressive process. At the same time, the model accounts for the possibility of duration dependence by including the duration of ongoing conflict and the total

number of past conflict years (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998). My focus on the incidence of conflict over conflict onset avoids making the arbitrary decision of how much time must elapse between conflicts. In robustness checks, I evaluate the extent to which the results hold up in a model that codes new conflicts that began after 1, 2, and 3 years, respectively. I also compare the results to alternative specifications that account for the length of time that each institution was in place and estimate Markov transition models by restricting the sample to observations in which there was no conflict in the previous year. In additional models, I consider the conditional impact of consociational institutions and ethnic heterogeneity on the *magnitude* of conflict, given by whether there were between 25 and 999 or 1,000 or more battle-related deaths in a year (N. Gleditsch et al., 2002).

To test the effects of consociational institutions, I use dummy variables representing parliamentarism, proportionalism, and federalism. I denote parliamentary regimes based on whether the head of state was also the head of government (*v2exhoshog*). In presidential regimes, the head of state and the head of government are almost always the same person; this is true for 98% of observations coded by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) as presidential democracies. In mixed (semi-presidential) regimes and parliamentary regimes, the head of state and head of government are represented by different individuals. Respectively, 98% and 100% of observations coded by Cheibub et al. (2010) as mixed and parliamentary regimes had different heads of state and heads of government. Notably, using this distinction treats some nondemocracies as being parliamentary regimes. Doing so does not place any restrictions on how democratic a country should be for consociational institutions to count and is consistent with the notion that the executive selection process in "parliamentary dictatorships" incentivizes cooperation between party elites (Roberts, 2015).[8] Nevertheless, I control for the level of democracy and in subsequent model specifications compare the effect of omitting less democratic regimes from the sample.

I identify countries with PR based on whether the electoral system used to select the lower chamber of the legislature was proportional (*v2elparlel*), filling in the values between elections. To distinguish more federalist countries from more unitary, I code countries as unitary if they fell below 0.5 on the division of power index constructed by V-Dem (*v2x_feduni*) and 1 if they were above it. Both the proportional and federal dummies match well with other measures of these features; for example, they capture around 91% of observations coded by Norris (2009) as proportional and 73% of observations coded as federal.[9] Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of observations in which each combination of institutions occurred. Although 169 of the 171 countries in the data had one or more of the three institutions at some point,



Figure 2. Proportion of observations, by consociational institution.

country-year observations in which at least one of them was present make up 76% of all observations. Similar information is reported in the Supplemental Appendix, which displays observations by country and year (Figure A-1).[10]

Scholars' use of measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization has come under considerable scrutiny (Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Saideman, 2017). Arguments against using it include that it ignores the way in which ethnic identities vary over time as well as the multidimensionality of ethnicity as a concept (Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Laitin & Posner, 2001; Selway, 2010). Specific constellations of ethnic power may matter more, leading scholars to focus on group concentration and to use geographic data (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011; Wimmer et al., 2009; Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). Posner (2004) suggested that existing fractionalization measures are inappropriate because they include all ethnic groups and not just those that are politically relevant. Accordingly, alternative measures of ethnic divisions have focused on identifying the main groups in competition and included ethnic groups that are either nationally represented or discriminated against (Cederman et al., 2010; Posner, 2004). Selway (2010) used information about ethnicity in nationally representative surveys to measure the extent of overlap

between ethnic and religious identities, highlighting the possibility of multiple salient cleavages. My use of ethnolinguistic fractionalization aims to demonstrate nonlinearities in the concept and to evaluate them against findings about institutions based on their interaction with these data. The value of doing so is to test the validity of previous conclusions about the effects of inclusive arrangements that relied on a measure of ethnic heterogeneity to represent diversity.

I primarily use the measure of ethnic fractionalization created by Reynal-Querol (2002), which is based on an index used by Hirschman (1945) and Herfindahl (1950) to measure competition between firms. The measure ranges from zero to one and indicates the probability that two randomly selected individuals would not belong to the same ethnic group; zero represents complete homogeneity, while one indicates complete heterogeneity.[11] My reliance on the data from Reynal-Querol (2002) is due to the fact that they were explicitly concerned with measuring both fractionalization and polarization. Observations are also more evenly spread across the scale based on the Reynal-Querol measure than other measures. A comparison of alternative measures of ethnic fractionalization, including a summary of included and omitted observations based on each, is provided in the Supplemental Appendix (Section B). The fractionalization measure correlates with the measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization constructed by Fearon (2003) at roughly .79 and with the survey-based measure of ethnic fractionalization by Selway (2010) at .66. In alternative specifications, I compare results based on measures of fractionalization and cross-cuttingness provided by Selway (2010) as well as the types of powersharing coded by Gates et al. (2016).

To compare the nonlinear effect of ethnic fractionalization on conflict likelihood, I include squared values of ethnic fractionalization. I also substitute it with ethnic polarization as a means of validating why the relationship between consociational institutions and ethnic diversity is curvilinear. The ethnolinguistic fractionalization measure is stationary over time, representing a "snapshot" of ethnic diversity in each country at the turn of the 21st century.[12] Alternate measures of ethnic diversity and inclusiveness, including the measures of fractionalization and cross-cuttingness by Selway (2010) as well as the latent powersharing estimates created Gates et al. (2016), are similarly time-invariant. My inclusion of the measure in time-series cross-sectional models with time-varying covariates thus follows the convention of treating ethnic diversity as a moderator, even where demographic or border changes may occur (Gates et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2017; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005, 2010; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Selway, 2010; Selway & Templeman, 2012).

In line with standard models of conflict—such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003)—I include logged values of per capita GDP, the estimates for which come from K. Gleditsch (2002). To account for the extent to which a country is democratic, I include the electoral democracy index constructed by V-Dem (*v2x_polyarchy*), which ranges from zero to one and combines latent information on the freedoms of expression and association, suffrage, and the quality of elections (Coppedge et al., 2018). Consociational elements—parliamentarism, PR, and federalism—are considerably more likely in democracies, but including democracy level as a control aims to discern how much those elements depend on other attributes of democracy and how well they may work in less democratic and transitional contexts. Bogaards (2013) noted that eight of nine postconflict agreements achieved peace, but only three were democratic, thus demonstrating that PR can promote peace without enhancing the prospects for democracy.

Insofar as the nature of conflict may have differed between the 19th and 20th centuries, and a greater number of countries enter the sample after 1900, I restrict the sample to the period 1900-2000. The final sample, which contains just under 7,000 country-year observations, represents 118 countries and contains little missingness. The analysis uses a logistic regression to estimate the impact of consociational institutions on conflict likelihood in ethnically heterogeneous settings.[13] All models include country-clustered standard errors and independent variables lagged by 1 year, and in robustness checks, I compare models that include country, year, and region fixed effects. Summary statistics for the measures are provided in Supplemental Appendix (Table A-1). Additional information about the countries included in the analysis is also available in the Supplemental Appendix (Section A).

Results

The results are reported as odds ratios, for which values greater than one represent a greater likelihood and values less than one indicate lower odds. Likelihood ratio tests between models with and without squared values of ethnic fractionalization, and with interaction terms between ethnic fractionalization and institutional variables, indicate that their inclusion improves model fit. Treating all three institutions as substitutes provides little support for the argument. As shown in the first model in Table A-2 in Supplemental Appendix, however, the relationship is apparent when I represent consociationalism through either PR or parliamentarism. The reference category is observations in which neither of the two institutions occurred. Where either was present, countries were much more likely to experience conflict at higher



Figure 3. Estimated impact of parliamentary or PR on conflict likelihood, across levels of ethnic fractionalization: (a) results using Brecke (2001); (b) results using N. Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002).
PR = proportional representation, showing 90% confidence intervals.

levels of ethnic fractionalization but also much less likely to have conflict at more extreme levels of diversity.

Figure 3 illustrates the effects of parliamentarism or proportionalism across levels of ethnic fractionalization using both conflict data sets, plotting the expected values with 90% confidence intervals from a model that includes both linear and quadratic interaction terms (Table A-2 and Table

A-4 in Supplemental Appendix). The expected values were produced by running 1,000 simulations of the parameters across levels of ethnic fractionalization, holding the control variables at their means (Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 2003). Substituting the Reynal-Querol measure of ethnic fractionalization measure with the measure by Selway does not show a similar relationship for conflict data spanning the period 1900-2000, but it is curvilinear in the sample based on UCDP data (Section C in Supplemental Appendix). The same is true of Fearon's measure of ethnic fractionalization. For all three measures of ethnic diversity, therefore, there is some support for an inverse U-shaped relationship with parliamentarism or PR on the likelihood of observing conflict.

The second model in Table A-2 includes each of the three institutions without interacting them, giving the anticipated effects of each when the other two were not present. The interpretation of the estimates for each is its expected effect on conflict likelihood in more ethnically heterogeneous settings, *controlling* for other institutions. Comparing the three institutions independently of one another against observations in which none of them were present confirms that both parliamentarism and PR augment conflict risk at mid-range levels of ethnic diversity but diminish the risk at higher levels, the estimates for which are significant below a 5% probability of error. Federalism, by contrast, does not show a similar relationship with ethnic diversity.

The aforementioned models overlook the potential for specific combinations to affect the outcome. Meanwhile, roughly 34% of the sample involves observations with some combination of parliamentarism, proportionalism, and federalism. Table A-3 in Supplemental Appendix therefore compares the interaction between all possible combinations of the three institutions and ethnic diversity. The reference category is cases without any of the three institutions, corresponding to countries with presidential, majoritarian, and unitary political systems.

Accounting for the combined effects of PR, parliamentarism, and federalism, there are three specific arrangements whose joint impact with ethnic diversity on conflict shows a significant arc. This is true for PR, parliamentarism and federalism, and parliamentarism and PR, the estimates for which are significant below a 5% probability of error. Figure 4 shows the expected values across levels of ethnic fractionalization based on 1,000 simulations of the parameters in Table A-3. The results illustrate that the combination of PR and parliamentarism exacerbates conflict risk at mid-range levels of ethnic diversity, whereas federalism is associated with greater conflict likelihood in the most diverse settings. Although they are not statistically significant,



Figure 4. Estimated impact of institutional combinations on conflict likelihood, across levels of ethnic fractionalization, showing 90% confidence intervals.

similar relationships are observable in models based on the UCDP conflict data, shown in Table A-5 and illustrated by Figure A-2 in Supplemental Appendix.

The results demonstrate the importance of thinking about ethnic heterogeneity as a nonlinear concept. Conflict risk stemming from parliamentarism and PR initially increases and then declines at higher levels of ethnic diversity. The impact of federalism is quite different, however, seemingly increasing the likelihood of observing domestic conflict across levels of ethnic fractionalization. Moreover, specific combinations of institutions affiliated with consociationalism, such as proportionalism and parliamentarism or parliamentarism and federalism, may increase conflict risk at mid-range levels of ethnic diversity but decrease it in more diverse settings.

The theoretical reason for why consociationalism may not provide an institutional solution for "mid-range" settings is supported by replacing the measure of ethnic fractionalization with a related measure of polarization, which indicates the extent to which there are a few large, balanced ethnic groups (Reynal-Querol, 2002). This is illustrated by Figure 5, which shows the independent effect of each institution on the incidence of conflict across levels of ethnic polarization. As the figure shows, proportionalism exacerbates conflict risk in more ethnically polarized settings, while the relationship between federalism and ethnic polarization (and parliamentarism and polarization) does not show a meaningful impact on the incidence of conflict in a given year. Plotting the interaction of specific institutional combinations and ethnic polarization indicates that PR, parliamentarism, and federalism, and parliamentarism and PR, are more likely to exacerbate conflict in polarized settings (refer to Section C in Supplemental Appendix).

The hypothesis that the effects of consociational institutions are not monotonic across levels of ethnic diversity thus finds support as it regards PR and specific consociational arrangements. It is an important qualification to existing analyses that assert that such institutions may not provide remedies for quelling the potential for conflict arising from diverse preferences in multiethnic settings. At a minimum, acknowledging the complexity of the relationships at hand—the combined effects of different institutions and differences in their effects across levels of ethnic diversity—implores scholars to not write them off as poor solutions for ethnically diverse settings, but to consider their impact in more polarized environments. The inverted U-shaped relationship associated with parliamentarism and PR may actually provide a more accurate assessment of when consociationalism should be effective, given the emphasis by Lijphart (1969) on the need for a multiple rather than a dual balance of power among subcultures.



Figure 5. Estimated impact of institutions on conflict likelihood, across levels of ethnic polarization, showing 90% confidence intervals.

Robustness Tests

I subjected the results to multiple robustness tests and evaluated the relationships under alternative specifications. Tables showing the results based on a subset of these specifications are provided in the Supplemental Appendix (Section D). The results are somewhat different when I use the measure of ethnic fractionalization by Selway (2010) in place of Reynal-Querol (2002). An inverted U-shaped relationship between ethnic diversity and parliamentarism and proportionalism is evident in the sample based on UCDP data (N. Gleditsch et al., 2002). However, it is not apparent in the data coded by Brecke (2001). The same is true for models that use the ethnic fractionalization measure created by Fearon (2003). As Section B in the Supplemental Appendix illustrates, one possibility is attributable to skewness in the ethnic fractionalization measure created by Selway (2010), which tends toward greater homogeneity and codes fewer observations as highly diverse. The discrepancy is more likely due to differences in the measurement of ethnic fractionalization or to the battle-death thresholds that distinguish the conflict data than to the time period, as the results hold when I restrict the data by

Brecke (2001) to the post-WWII period. When I interact the different combinations of PR, parliamentarism, and federalism with the Selway (2010) measure, only PR and federalism, and all three combined, support the hypothesis below a 10% probability of error.

The results are robust to the inclusion of counts of the length of time that each institution had been in place, as well as to controls for geographical region and year fixed effects. Notably, controlling for the duration of each institution suggests that the likelihood of observing conflict decreases by roughly 2% with each additional year of PR and increases by nearly 1% with each year of parliamentarism. The significance of the estimates underscores the value of further considering the impact of the persistence of institutions. The curvilinear relationships that I identified between ethnic fractionalization and PR, as well as with the combination of parliamentarism and federalism, also hold in models that estimate the start of new conflicts after 1, 2, and 3 years. The combination of PR and federalism also appears significant and curvilinearly related to ethnic fractionalization in models of conflict onset.

The hypotheses maintain support when I restrict the sample to more democratic regimes by omitting observations scoring in the lower 25th-percentile of electoral democracy. Restricting the sample to the top 50% of democracies shows only parliamentarism to have a curvilinear interaction when ethnic fractionalization. One possibility is that proportionalism helps to moderate conflict risk in less democratic states with greater ethnic diversity, whereas parliamentarism plays a greater role in more democratic states. Similar relationships are also apparent in models estimating conflict intensity—consociational elements may therefore not only reduce conflict *likelihood* in more diverse settings, they may also be associated with less severe conflicts.

It bears mentioning that the curvilinear relationships identified in this article are not evident in interactions between consociational institutions and religious diversity. Likewise, incorporating the extent to which ethnic and religious identities are cross-cutting does not show similar trends. It could be the case that consociationalism is less successful for moderating conflicts stemming from religious identity. Additional figures in Section B of the Supplemental Appendix, however, also show that the relationship between ethnic and religious fractionalization—and between the measure of ethnic fractionalization created by Reynal-Querol (2002) and ethno-religious cross-cuttingness—is not straightforward.

Given the persistent nonlinearities in the joint effects of institutions associated with consociationalism and ethnic fractionalization on conflict likelihood, I also estimated models that evaluated the joint effects of ethnic diversity and estimates of powersharing types created by Gates et al. (2016). On the face of it, the relationships do not look the same; dispersive

powersharing appears to have an inverse U-shaped relationship with ethnic fractionalization, increasing the likelihood of conflict at mid-range levels of diversity and then decreasing it in more divided settings, whereas constraining powersharing is associated with more conflict in more diverse environments. All the same, it is not clear what composes each of the three powersharing types. T-tests indicate that observations with parliamentarism, proportionalism, or federalism have significantly higher means for each of the three types.

As an additional way of testing the direction of the relationship between conflict and institutions, I specified logistic regressions estimating each of the three institutions. The results suggest that ethnic diversity is not significantly related to the selection of PR, parliamentary systems, or federal systems. PR is more likely where there was conflict, whereas federalism is significantly more likely in more diverse settings with conflict. Federalism may therefore be more strongly endogenous to conflict, an issue raised by Waldner and Lust (2018). The choice of PR, while it is often recommended as a result of conflict, does not appear to be more likely to result from conflict in more ethnically fractionalized settings. This is heartening, insofar as the conflict-reducing impacts of PR in observations with greater ethnic diversity is the most robust relationship across models.

Discussion

In empirical models estimating the interactive effects of consociational institutions and ethnic fractionalization on civil conflict, comparing model fit shows that modeling the interaction as a nonlinear relationship represents an improvement. Doing so indicates that some political institutions that are thought to promote inclusiveness and accommodation, such as parliamentarism and PR, are positively associated with the incidence of conflict at higher levels of ethnic diversity but less so at the highest levels. The curvilinear relationship of PR and parliamentarism with ethnic fractionalization is present across a number of different model specifications, including controlling for fixed effects, duration dependence, and limiting the analysis to conflict onset. The observed relationship is not evident in some models that use alternate measures of ethnic fractionalization and domestic conflict, but is a persistent trend.

The finding that parliamentarism and PR are associated with greater conflict risk at mid-range values of ethnic diversity, but less so in more fractionalized settings, adds an important qualification to extant research that concluded that they only worsen conflict risk in more ethnically divided societies. The potential for such institutions to engender more conflict results

from interpretations of their linear interaction with ethnic diversity; in reality, consociationalism was not necessarily intended for societies characterized by bifurcated or polarized environments. Although previous studies left the relationship between political institutions and polarization to be addressed in future work, I demonstrate that it is central to understanding the ways in which consociational elements operate in more ethnically diverse settings. Three institutional arrangements consistently stood out as having a nonmonotonic relationship with ethnic fractionalization—proportionalism, parliamentarism and proportionalism, and parliamentarism and federalism. Thus, PR, either by itself or in combination with parliamentary systems, may be beneficial for highly fractionalized societies. Federalism, which plays a dispersive role, may work better alongside other institutions that promote inclusiveness. This supports arguments that the potentially negative effects of regional parties can be moderated by the electoral system (Brancati, 2006). A central takeaway from this research is that an outstanding conclusion from the literature on civil wars—that the polarization of identity groups aggravates the potential for violence—constitutes an important and overlooked qualification for when consociational arrangements should be successful. The prevailing practice of recommending proportional systems in postconflict settings may help, despite the fact that its successfulness can difficult to discern.

The results provide guidance for future research at the nexus of political institutions, ethnic diversity, and conflict. First, scholars have pointed out issues involved in using existing measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Ethnicity is part of a broader set of identity categories that can be fluid, multidimensional, and personal, and may not always play a motivating role in determining political outcomes (Chandra, 2006; Frable, 1997; Rothchild & Groth, 1995). The relevance of ethnic identity in conflict processes also depends on which aspects of identity politicians use to mobilize citizens and on intergroup dynamics (Brancati, 2006; Chandra, 2004). This article used fractionalization to demonstrate that conclusions from previous research on the impact of consociational institutions were based on a flawed interpretation of their interaction with ethnic diversity. Given more sophisticated ways to conceptualize and measure ethnic identity, the main points of the article should still apply: to the extent that identity is reducible to one dimension, with more and fewer groups placed along that dimension, understanding how political institutions moderate its impact on conflict risk should not rest on the assumption that their interactions are linear. For this reason, it may be rash to dismiss consociational institutions as ineffective for moderating conflict risk associated with ethnic divisions.

Conclusion

This article argued that it is necessary to reconsider how institutions affect conflict where there is more ethnic diversity. The results challenge the notion that the relationship between ethnic diversity and conflict is a linear one, for which it would be inappropriate to portray consociational institutions as features that only exacerbate conflict risk across all levels of ethnic diversity. Several valuable findings emerge from this analysis that support some existing findings and help to qualify others. The first is that the effect of ethnic diversity on conflict is not consistent across levels of ethnic fractionalization. This substantiates the claim by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) that ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization are related but different aspects that connect ethnicity to civil conflict. It also matches the results of others who have accounted for the nonmonotonic effects of ethnic heterogeneity (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Collier et al., 2004; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2002; Ellingsen, 2000; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Sambanis, 2001).

The finding that mid-range levels of ethnic diversity have a greater impact on conflict likelihood is consistent across models and supports the expectation that more ethnically *polarized* societies are more prone to violence. This has important implications for the debate on the effectiveness of consociational institutions and consensus democracy. Ethnic polarization is associated with lengthier conflicts and can spread (Forsberg, 2008; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2010); polarization may also play an especially pernicious role in democracies in the 21st century (Somer & McCoy, 2018, 2019). Across models based on different specifications, proportionalism shows an independent effect on reducing the risk of domestic conflict in the most diverse settings; in combination with other institutions, there is support for parliamentary and federal and proportional and parliamentary systems. They demonstrate the potential for parliamentarism and PR to act in accordance with Lijphart's expectations about consociationalism. This challenges previous conclusions, suggesting that they were based on faulty assumptions about the way in which political institutions and ethnic diversity interact. Nevertheless, the results do not reject previous research outright, so much as they encourage a qualification of it—while PR and parliamentary systems may have positive effects in more diverse settings, they should be problematic in ethnically polarized settings.

The dissimilarity of different ethnic fractionalization measures, in combination with criticisms that such measures are outdated and ignore the depth of divisions, enhance the attractiveness of alternative measures that emphasize cross-cuttingness and which identify the main groups in contention (Cederman et al., 2010; Posner, 2004; Selway, 2010). All the same, this article underscores

that analyses should be wary of the outstanding conclusion that ethnic diversity augments conflict risk in the presence of powersharing institutions. Scholars should use the insight of how polarized identities contribute to conflict to distinguish those circumstances in which inclusive and accommodative institutions can help to mitigate intergroup violence. The findings also point to the importance of considering how the effects of political institutions on conflict risk change over time as a function of their duration.

A number of other factors may jointly determine the stability of a particular arrangement, including institutional legacies (Pilet, 2005; Pospieszna & Schneider, 2013), the timing and extent of postconflict provisions (Brancati & Snyder, 2011; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Joshi, Melander, & Quinn, 2017; Pospieszna & Schneider, 2013), district-level dynamics and specific constellations of ethnic power (Cederman et al., 2010; Gallagher, 1992; Hartmann, 2013; Wimmer et al., 2009), and powersharing in *practice*, specifically in combination with democracy (Bormann et al., 2014; Strøm, Gates, Graham, & Strand, 2015). It may also be shaped by the clarity of identities and divisions and the unique context in which it is applied (Chandra, 2005; Hartmann, 2013; Salamey, 2009). The results nevertheless encourage scholars to further consider the way in which institutions interact with ethnic diversity, suggesting that it may be too soon to disregard consensus options for promoting stable government.

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Supplemental Material

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Notes

1. Throughout the article, I use the terms "heterogeneity," "fractionalization," and "diversity" interchangeably to refer to a greater number of groups.
2. This article focuses on domestic conflict, defined as "purposive and lethal violence among two or more social groups pursuing conflicting political goals that results in fatalities, with at least one belligerent group organized under the command of authoritative leadership" (Cioffi-Revilla, 1996, p. 8). This is the definition employed by Brecke (1999, 2001) to code internal armed conflicts.
3. See also Ake (1967) and Apter (1961).
4. For a more in-depth discussion of consociationalism, see Mühlbacher (2009), Grofman and Stockwell (2001), or Andeweg (2000).
5. Gates, Graham, Lupu, Strand, and Strøm (2016) defined "constraining" arrangements as those that limit the power of officeholders, whereas "dispersive" institutional arrangements distribute authority among groups and "inclusive" arrangements enhance the representation and participation of groups.
6. Figure 1 is similar to Figure 1 shown by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
7. References to "high" and "highest" levels of ethnic diversity connote linear versus quadratic interpretations of its effects.
8. Roughly 50% of the civilian and military dictatorships coded by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) have heads of state that are different from the head of government based on the V-Dem measure.
9. Nearly 100% of observations that Norris (2009) coded as majoritarian are similarly coded, whereas 84% of observations coded as unitary are also indicated by the dummy variable.
10. The Supplemental Appendix lists the number of observations by country and institution.
11. A list of countries and their corresponding ethnic fractionalization and polarization values is available in the Supplemental Appendix.
12. The measure of ethnic fractionalization was originally proposed by Reynal-Querol (2001).
13. Although some studies, such as Selway and Templeman (2012), have utilized fixed effects vector decomposition to deal with unit-fixed effects in data that are largely time-invariant (see Plümper & Troeger, 2007), others argue that it is an ineffective solution that can produce inconsistent standard errors (Breusch, Ward, Nguyen, & Kompas, 2011; Greene, 2011).

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